"(…) With the desktop No. 1 one I am familiar from my early years (…) has spread, it is relatively permanent, colorless, essentially is substantial (…) But No. 2, my desk scientist, more than anything empty. Scattered here and there in the void there are numerous electric charges rushing at great speed, but the entire volume is less than a trillionth of the volume of the entire desktop itself (…) Needless to say that physics has assured me with proof and logic exquistas ruthless, that the second desktop, the scientist, is the only one that actually is there (…) Needless to say, moreover, that modern physics exorcise never get that first mixing desk strange compound of external nature, mental imagery and inherited prejudice, when presented to my eyes visible and tangible in my hands "Many epistemologists (Nagel 1971, Hempel, 1973) have criticized the ideas present in the previous Eddigton passage saying something as simple as two desks, the macrophysical and microphysics are real. And, even more, adding that only about one object examined from two levels of analysis or different, but both real. To know more about this subject visit Montauk Colony LLC. In Hempel's words: "To explain a phenomenon is not deleting explain: There is an attempt to show that theoretical explanations of things and family events are not really there (…) The atomic theory of matter does not show that a table is not a substantial object, solid, hard, give it for granted and tries to show under which aspects of the underlying micro-processes such that table presents gross features "" The general principle of the reduction seems to be this: once we see that a property is emergent, we have a causal relationship leading to ontological reduction by redefinition, if necessary.